Microsoft DevSecOps & Supply Chain Security interview questions

Threat modelling dies as a document ritual and lives as a design-stage habit. The answer that scores: tier reviews by blast radius, short sessions on RFCs, findings filed where engineers already work.

Push approval is a weak factor and fatigue is its predictable failure mode. Stop the campaign with number matching and rate limits; end the attack class with passkeys, device gating and a hardened helpdesk.

Labels without consequences die quietly. Attach classification to enforced defaults in Terraform modules, propagate tags to every copy of the data, and give engineers twenty worked examples instead of a taxonomy lecture.

An agent is a workload that acts on behalf of a person, holds credentials for several systems, and decides what to call based on text it read. Every one of those properties breaks an assumption in your existing access model.

Model output is attacker-influenced data by construction, because the model reads attacker-influenced input. Every rule you already apply to user input applies here, and teams forget because the text came from a system they built.

Experienced answers are ordered and verifiable: minimal base, benchmark applied as code, identity and exposure next, then continuous proof it stayed that way. Checklists recited out of order are the tell.

Easy to define and easy to fail. The scoring half is where each gate sits, what it does to build time, and the honest admission of what the whole set misses.

Three terms that get used interchangeably and answer three different questions. The one that makes them operational is the admission rule at the end: no provenance, no deploy.

Everyone endorses least privilege; few can describe how they would measure over-permission across a fleet. The scoring answer names the evidence source, the tiered remediation, and the break-glass hatch that makes it survivable.

Reciting injection classes you cannot fix is the trap. The scored move maps each risk category to a lever an ops or platform engineer owns, from response headers to metadata endpoints.

Miners prove unauthorized workload execution, not a particular intrusion sequence. Parallel identity and network containment, backup control-plane protection, rebuild-don't-clean, and restore points older than patient zero.

Volumetric floods die at the anycast edge; everything else reaches your origin anyway. The origin leak, expensive endpoints and unproxied surfaces decide whether a CDN is armour or decoration.

Four scanners, four different things they see, and one rule that decides whether any of them help: a finding that arrives at the release gate is an argument, and the same finding on a pull request is a ten-minute fix.

Encryption is the part people focus on and the least interesting part. What you are buying is short-lived credentials, a revocation path and an audit trail, none of which an environment variable can give you.

Measuring the whole codebase gives a team an unpayable debt and a gate they turn off. Measuring only the lines changed in this pull request gives them a gate they can pass today.

Workload authentication, traffic encryption and authorization need separate verification. Admission and RBAC constrain who can deploy a workload that bypasses those controls.

The single highest-value security change available to most pipelines, and the reason it works is worth understanding rather than configuring. It removes the secret rather than protecting it.

Most clusters fail an RBAC review on the same handful of patterns. Naming them concretely, plus the namespace-first design that prevents them, is what separates operators from tutorial readers.

Naming the replacement is the floor of this question. What scores is the audit-then-warn-then-enforce sequence and an honest answer about the vendor chart you cannot fix.

Signing proves what shipped, not what runs. The strong answer covers syscall-level detection, the signals that matter, tuning against alert fatigue, and the response path once a sensor fires.