Expert DevOps interview questions

The two ideas that decide whether an operator is safe are level-triggered reconciliation and finalizer semantics. The partition question separates people who have written a controller from people who have installed one.

The kubelet is a local reconcile loop with its own event stream, probe workers and eviction brain. The detail worth holding onto is that Ready status can reflect either a reported health failure or missing heartbeats, and those have different causes and different fixes.

Repeated full-resource polling can make an operator an expensive API client. This question separates people who run controllers at ten-thousand-object scale from those who copied a tutorial: watch semantics, cache behaviour, and which LISTs touch etcd.

One disk metric explaining a whole cluster's weirdness is the point of this question. Restarting etcd first turns a slow cluster into a down one, because a restarted member has to catch up before it can vote.

NFS waits can stall shutdown and inflate load average while CPUs stay idle. Check the blocked kernel path before deciding whether signals or mount recovery can release it.

Bandwidth graphs look healthy and the partner swears they are fine. The wall is ports, not bits: the available source-port budget depends on the gateway and its address allocation.

An agent is a workload that acts on behalf of a person, holds credentials for several systems, and decides what to call based on text it read. Every one of those properties breaks an assumption in your existing access model.

Model output is attacker-influenced data by construction, because the model reads attacker-influenced input. Every rule you already apply to user input applies here, and teams forget because the text came from a system they built.

The Google-style NALSD round in miniature. The boxes are easy; what is being scored is whether the numbers fall out of Little's law before you draw them.

Leases prevent dead holders but not overlapping ones. The staff-level answer is fencing tokens and a candid account of why quorum lock services without downstream checks are still probabilistic.

Reciting both acronyms is the median answer. Expert level chooses by connectivity assumptions and undo semantics, then defends CRDT metadata growth with numbers.

Teams need comparable evaluations before they approve a model change. Design versioned test data, recorded runs and release thresholds that a pipeline can enforce.

The hard parts are not search. They are deciding what to keep before you pay to store it, isolating one team's query from everyone else's, and making the cost visible to the people generating it.

Without one, every team implements its own retries, its own key handling, its own logging policy, and nobody can answer what the company spends or what a model change would break.

At sixteen GPUs and above, the network is the computer. Collectives run at the speed of the worst link in the group, and placement decides which link that is.

Code rollouts ask 'does it work'; model rollouts ask 'is it better', and the second question has no HTTP status code. Shadow traffic, offline eval gates and quality canaries replace the 500-rate dashboards you cannot use.

Both configurations fit the weights. Compare cache capacity, collective overhead and replica placement under the actual traffic shape; neither layout wins every workload.

Prefill and decode are two different workloads sharing one GPU. Their resource demands differ, and an unchunked long prefill can delay active decodes. Profile the actual model and batch shape before choosing a scheduling change.

It trades compute for latency, so it wins on an underloaded fleet and can lose on a saturated one. The acceptance rate decides everything, and the acceptance rate depends on traffic you do not control.

Latency is flat, errors are zero, and the answers are worse. Quality regression is invisible to every metric a platform team normally owns, which is why it needs its own pipeline.

Failure stops being an event and becomes a rate. Once mean time between failures drops below the length of a run, the design question is not how to avoid interruption but how cheaply you can absorb one.

Untrusted text reaching a privileged agent is the whole vulnerability. It is the pull_request_target mistake again, with a model in the middle that will follow instructions it finds in the data.

Shared batching puts two tenants' data in one process on one device. That is defensible, and it is not what most customers assume they bought, so the answer has to be specific about which boundary exists where.